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INTRODUCTION 
On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), in 
response to an application filed by the ICC Prosecutor, issued an 
arrest warrant for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, the current sitting 
president of Sudan.2 The judges of the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I 
determined that there were “reasonable grounds to believe” that Al-
Bashir bears personal criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute 
 2. See generally Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf; Int’l Criminal Court, Office of 
the Prosecutor, Situation in Darfur, the Sudan: Public Redacted Version of the 
Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, ¶ 416, ICC-02/05 (July 14, 2008), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc559999.pdf [hereinafter 
Prosecutor’s Application] (urging the Pre-Trial Chamber to find that there are 
“reasonable grounds to believe that [President] Al-Bashir committed” crimes under 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to issue a warrant for his 
arrest). 
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of the ICC (“Rome Statute”) for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in Darfur, Sudan.3 Specifically, the Court found 
reason to believe that Al-Bashir directed branches of the Sudanese 
government to implement a “common plan” with the aim of 
subjecting the civilian population of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
ethnic groups to “unlawful attacks, forcible transfers and acts of 
murder, extermination, rape, torture, and pillage . . . .”4 Ultimately, 
the Court satisfied itself that, under Article 58 of the Rome Statute, 
Al-Bashir’s arrest was necessary to guarantee his appearance at trial, 
prohibit him from endangering the proceedings, and prevent further 
atrocities in Darfur.5
The ICC was formally established as a permanent international 
criminal court in 2002 with the entry into force of the Rome Statute, 
and Al-Bashir’s warrant represents the latest installment in a long 
line of “firsts” that the ongoing conflict in Sudan has presented to the 
fledgling institution.6 The Darfur conflict is the first situation in 
 3. See Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on 
the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al Bashir, ¶¶ 209-223 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf [hereinafter Al-Bashir Warrant Decision] 
(finding that Al-Bashir was an “indirect” perpetrator of crimes directly committed 
by the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Janjaweed Militias, and other branches of the 
Sudanese state). Though the Prosecutor initially alleged that Al-Bashir was 
complicit in genocide as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Pre-
Trial Chamber majority found that the totality of the Prosecutor’s evidence failed 
to establish reasonable grounds to believe the Government of Sudan acted with the 
requisite specific intent necessary to support a charge of genocide. Id. ¶¶ 205-206. 
See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (granting the court jurisdiction 
over: “(a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; 
[and] (d) The crime of aggression”). 
 4. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 214-216 (finding that the 
unlawful attacks on civilians were a part of a larger counter-insurgency strategy 
against rebel groups in Darfur). 
 5. See id. ¶¶ 227-236 (stressing Al-Bashir’s refusal to execute two previous 
ICC warrants, his public defiance of the Court’s jurisdiction in Sudan, the 
conviction of a Sudanese official for treason because of his cooperation with the 
ICC, and the recent attack on an internally displaced persons (“IDP”) camp by 
Sudanese government forces); see also Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 58(1)(b) 
(authorizing the Court to issue an arrest warrant if it appears necessary: “(i) To 
ensure the person’s appearance at trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not 
obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings; or (iii) Where 
applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of that 
crime . . . ”). 
 6. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. (recognizing that the numerous 
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which the Court’s jurisdiction has been activated by a referral from 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.7 
The cases arising out of Darfur are the first instances that the Court 
has sought to exercise its jurisdiction over nationals of a non-State 
Party to the Rome Statute that has not consented to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.8 Finally, although the Rome Statute allows the ICC to 
disregard a suspect’s official title,9 Al-Bashir’s indictment is the first 
time that the ICC has been asked to exercise its jurisdiction over an
atrocities committed over the course of the twentieth century were the impetus for 
the creation of the ICC); Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, ‘This Prosecution Will 
Endanger the People We Wish to Defend in Sudan’, The Observer, July 13, 2008, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/13/sudan.humanrights 
(noting that Al-Bashir is the first incumbent Head of State indicted by the ICC and 
arguing that the indictment is a mistake because of the danger it will be ineffective, 
spur Al-Bashir to retreat from peace negotiations, and cause more suffering among 
Darfur’s civilian population); see also A Dilemma Over Darfur: Calculating the 
Consequences of Indicting Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, for Genocide and 
More, Economist.com, July 15, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/ 
international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11737170 [hereinafter A Dilemma Over 
Darfur] (recognizing the unprecedented nature of the Prosecutor’s request and the 
diplomatic pressure on the Prosecutor not to “aim for the top” in acting against the 
Sudanese government). 
 7. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(b) (stipulating that the Security 
Council must act under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in order to refer a situation 
to the ICC); S.C. Res. 1593, pmbl., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) 
(referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC because the conflict threatens 
international peace and security); Young Sok Kim, The Law of the International 
Criminal Court 1 (2007) (asserting that the ICC is meant to “contribute to the 
preservation, restoration and maintenance of international peace and security”); 
Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council's Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to 
the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: 
Implications for the International Criminal Court's Functions and Status, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 650, 652-53 (2006) (recognizing that the referral was 
unexpected, as the United States had voiced its opposition to using the Court to 
address the situation in Darfur and was expected to veto such a move). See 
generally U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (providing the Security Council with the power 
to act when international peace is threatened or breached, or in response to acts of 
aggression). 
 8. See Philipp Kastner, The ICC in Darfur—Savior or Spoiler?, 14 ISLA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 145, 146 (2007) (recognizing that although Sudan is a signatory 
to the Rome Statute, it has not yet ratified the Statute and has repeatedly rejected 
ICC jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals). 
 9. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 27 (making official titles, such 
as Head of State, irrelevant before the ICC and directing the Court to ignore the 
privileges usually associated with such titles). 
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individual who, as a sitting president, is entitled to the international 
protections provided by the doctrine of Head of State immunity.10
The focus of this Comment is twofold. First, it analyzes the bases 
of the ICC’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over Al-Bashir given 
Sudan’s rejection of the Court’s validity and Al-Bashir’s position as 
Head of State.11 After concluding that the Rome Statute and U.N. 
Resolution 1593, which referred the Darfur situation to the ICC, 
furnish the Court with the legal authority to prosecute Al-Bashir, the 
analysis then shifts to the second focus: the practical limitations that 
these two documents and customary international law impose on the 
enforcement of Al-Bashir’s arrest warrant.12 This Comment argues 
that, given the Rome Statute’s prohibition on trials in absentia and 
the ICC’s dependence on states to carry out its warrants, Al-Bashir’s 
Head of State immunities could prevent states from arresting him, 
even in the face of a valid ICC warrant.13
 10. See Braced for the Aftershock, The Economist, Mar. 7, 2009, at 66-67 
(highlighting the possible ramifications of the ICC’s arrest warrant on United 
Nations forces in Sudan and presenting arguments for and against the U.N. 
Security Council’s decision to defer Al-Bashir’s warrant); see also A Dilemma 
over Darfur, supra note 6 (reporting that although other Heads of State such as 
Charles Taylor and Slobodan Milosevic have been indicted in international 
tribunals, Al-Bashir’s case represents the first time the ICC has done so). See 
generally Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 106-08 
(2004) (providing a general history of the Head of State immunity doctrine from 
the 16th century through the creation of the Rome Statute). 
 11. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the 
International Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 419-32 (2004) (discussing 
how immunity-possessing officials of non-State Parties, State Parties, and 
international organizations may be treated under the Rome Statute). 
 12. See, e.g., Heyder, supra note 7, at 654-59 (exposing potential problems 
caused by the language of the Security Council referral including the lack of a 
requirement that states not party to the conflict in Darfur render assistance to the 
Prosecutor, the failure to provide any material support to the ICC’s investigations, 
and an exemption from ICC jurisdiction for all American citizens and all “current 
or former officials or personnel” from non-State Parties other than Sudan). 
 13. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 63 (providing that “[t]he accused shall 
be present during the trial”); Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International 
Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Law, in The International 
Criminal Court: Challenges to Achieving Justice and Accountability in the 21st 
Century 285, 287, 291 (Mark S. Ellis & Richard J. Goldstone eds., 2008) (arguing 
that the ICC is needed as a mechanism to enforce international criminal law and 
urging states to cooperate with the Court because the ICC does not have a police 
force that can execute its warrants); see also Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The 
International Criminal Court: Bottlenecks to Individual Criminal Liability in the 
Rome Statute, 12 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 209-16 (2006) (raising 
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In order to give some context to the ICC’s involvement in Sudan, 
Part I of this Comment traces the history of the conflict in Darfur and 
the response of the international community. It also lays out a brief 
history of the initial rationales behind the Head of State immunity 
doctrine and traces the evolution of the doctrine to its current 
boundaries. Part II analyzes the legality and enforceability of the 
ICC’s warrant for Al-Bashir in light of the relevant Rome Statute 
provisions, previous cases in international courts, customary 
international law, and the limitations imposed by U.N. Resolution 
1593. Part III then argues that the U.N. Security Council should 
refrain from deferring Al-Bashir’s warrant and instead recommends 
that the Security Council issue a more definitive resolution to ensure 
that Al-Bashir’s immunities do not prevent states from executing his 
warrant. It also suggests amending the Rome Statute to ensure that, 
in the case of a Security Council referral, all U.N. Member States are 
placed under international obligations to disregard a suspect’s 
international immunities and enforce ICC warrants. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF THE SITUATION IN DARFUR AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
The Darfur region of Sudan is a vast, arid, and ethnically diverse 
territory.14 It covers some 150,000 square miles and, by some 
accounts, its six million inhabitants belong to some forty to ninety 
tribes or ethnic groups.15 These tribes can be roughly grouped into 
questions about the ICC’s ability to function effectively given its reliance upon the 
cooperation of individual states and the impact of immunity agreements on 
cooperation). 
 14. See Gérard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide 2 (2005) 
(contrasting the fairly uniform geography and climate of the region to the diverse 
ethnic makeup of its inhabitants). 
 15. See Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. 
S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter ICID Report] (stating that while there are 
various urban centers across the region, most of the population live in small 
villages made up of “a few hundred families”); JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, 
DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 8-10 (2005) (explaining how 
Darfur’s history as an independent sultanate, human migration route, and target for 
invasion led to the ethnic diversity of the region); Prunier, supra note 14, at 2-3 
(describing the territory as an enormous plain encircling a relatively small 
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those that live mainly sedentary lifestyles, and those who are 
nomadic or semi-nomadic.16 Today, Darfur is most known for the 
brutal conflict that exploded in 2004 and has now led to allegations 
that the most serious of all international crimes—genocide—was 
committed in the region.17
Historically, inter-tribal conflicts in Darfur that arose out of land 
disputes were effectively settled through traditional legal systems 
administered by tribal leaders.18 By the mid-1980s, however, these 
structures had been abolished by the Government of Sudan (“GoS”) 
in favor of local administrations consisting of officials appointed 
from the Sudanese capitol, Khartoum.19 These imposed 
arrangements, however, proved to be ineffective in resolving 
renewed clashes between the Darfur tribes that were fueled by long 
droughts, increasing desertification, and the proliferation of weapons 
throughout the region.20 Through the remainder of the 1980s and into 
the 1990s, these inter-tribal conflicts continued to simmer.21 During 
mountainous area). 
 16. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 52 (explaining further that the sedentary 
tribes are composed of both agriculturalist tribes including the Fur and Masalit, 
and cattle herding tribes including the Zaghawa, while the nomadic tribes are 
primarily cattle or camel herders). 
 17. See Prunier, supra note 14, at vii-xi (tracing the international community’s 
recognition and response to the unfolding situation in Darfur in 2004); see also 
Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (accusing Al-Bashir of genocide 
against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups by deliberately imposing 
“conditions of life calculated to bring about [the groups’] physical destruction in 
part”); ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶¶ 52, 55, 62 (finding that the recent violence 
in Darfur is attributable, in part, to historical divisions in identity between tribes, 
disputes over scarce resources, limited opportunities for participation in the 
national political system, and the government’s perceived marginalization of 
Darfur). 
 18. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 57 (describing traditional conflict 
resolution structures in which tribal leaders would negotiate mutually acceptable 
compromises to disputes). 
 19. See id. (explaining that the change in structure weakened the power of the 
tribal dispute resolution mechanism because the state was no longer viewed as 
impartial in mediating such disputes). 
 20. See id. ¶¶ 55, 59 (establishing the relationship between desertification and 
increased conflicts because of land shortages and describing the failure of the 
government to effectively mediate these conflicts); id. ¶ 58 (implicating Chad and 
Libya in the spread of arms throughout the area and describing the formation of 
tribal militias). 
 21. See id. ¶ 59 (describing clashes between the “Arab Gathering,” composed 
mostly of the region’s nomadic tribes, and the “African Belt” that was created by 
members of the sedentary Fur tribe). 
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this time, tribal divisions in Darfur widened, and, for the first time, 
the terms “Arab” and “African” arose as meaningful distinctions 
between the region’s mostly sedentary African tribes and the mainly 
nomadic Arab tribes who otherwise shared a common language 
(Arabic) and religion (Islam).22
As disputes in Darfur rose to a boil in the late 1990s, President Al-
Bashir’s government effectively ignored the region.23 This neglect 
led to the formation of several rebel groups in protest to the political 
and economic marginalization of Darfur’s population.24 Although 
their policies differed, the two largest rebel groups both stressed the 
need for greater political participation in Sudan, and drew their 
members from the same three African tribes: the Fur, the Masalit, 
and the Zaghawa.25
Finally, in early 2003, the Darfur cauldron boiled over.26 By this 
time, a low-level war was already smoldering across the region, with 
the rebels’ staging numerous attacks on police stations and army 
encampments to which the government responded with both ground 
and air attacks.27 Between February and April, 2003, the rebels 
 22. See id. ¶ 60 (detailing the increasing significance of the “Arab” or 
“African” distinction throughout this time period, which in the past was more of a 
“passive distinction”); id. ¶ 52 (pointing out the religious and linguistic 
commonalities of the inhabitants of Darfur); see also Kastner, supra note 8, at 156-
57 (detailing the “Arab-Islamist” GoS’s alleged complicity in the creation of racist 
divisions between the Arab and African tribes); Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring 
the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent 
Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 188-89 (2006) (describing how the 
government encouraged the formation of an Arab alliance in Darfur to prevent 
dissent among the African tribes and then forcibly disarmed non-Arabs). 
 23. See Kastner, supra note 8, at 155-56 (outlining the government’s 
continuation of the British colonial policy of “deliberate underdevelopment” of 
Darfur throughout the 1980s and 1990s). 
 24. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 62 (outlining the formation and 
motivations of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (“SLM/A”) and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (“JEM”), which included, inter alia, greater political 
participation for the inhabitants of Darfur in the national government). 
 25. See id. (recognizing that despite their similar policies and support base, the 
policies of the SLM/A and the JEM formed as a result of different influences: the 
JEM was influenced largely by the ideals of political Islam, and the SLM/A drew 
its principles from the “New Sudan” policies of the SPLM/A, the main rebel group 
in the South Sudan civil war that began in 1983). 
 26. See Kastner, supra note 8, at 157 (describing a February 2003 SLM/A 
attack on the town of Golu, which killed two hundred government soldiers). 
 27. See FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 76 (positing that 
the rebellion began in 2001, but was not noticed by the international community 
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conducted a series of high profile attacks on government forces in 
several towns in Darfur.28 Initially, it appeared that the GoS was ill-
equipped to respond to these attacks.29 At the time, the GoS was 
conducting peace negotiations with the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”), its main opponent in the civil war in 
South Sudan that had been raging since 1983.30 Most of the GoS 
forces were still located in the south, and the forces it did have in 
Darfur were composed mostly of local Darfuris whom the 
government did not trust to fight their “own” people.31 This lack of 
government resources in the area led the GoS to use two tactics that 
proved instrumental in shaping the nature of the conflict in Darfur 
and ultimately contributed to the massive humanitarian violations 
that followed.32
First, faced with a severe lack of military capabilities on the 
ground and a dearth of training in desert warfare, Khartoum began to 
call upon local tribes in Darfur to aid in the fight against the rebels.33 
Members of the mostly nomadic Arab tribes, sensing an opportunity 
until 2003). 
 28. See generally Prunier, supra note 14, at 92, 95-96 (providing a timeline of 
major rebel attacks in Darfur, culminating with the audacious attack on the town of 
El Fashir during which the rebels occupied a government military airport). Prunier 
further reports that, “according to U.S. sources [the rebels] also executed around 
200 army prisoners after they had surrendered . . . .” Id. at 96. 
 29. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 66 (attributing the government’s 
inability to respond to the attacks to the significant deployment of the military to 
the south and the minimal presence of the military in Darfur’s urban centers); see 
also FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 99-101 (stating that the 
government’s forces were initially overwhelmed by the tactics employed by the 
rebels, who utilized small, highly mobile teams of vehicles to strike unexpectedly 
in different areas). 
 30. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 50 (describing the civil war in South 
Sudan and the peace process that culminated with a 2005 agreement providing for 
the possibility of self-determination for southern Sudan). 
 31. See id. ¶ 66; cf. Kastner, supra note 8, at 157 (stating further that the GoS 
hoped to destroy the insurrection in Darfur before it could unravel the peace 
process in South Sudan). 
 32. See FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 101-02 (asserting 
that the GoS knew that arming and using Darfuri tribes against each other would 
inevitably result in violations of human rights). 
 33. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 67 (indicating that the choice to use local 
tribes was consciously made to take advantage of existing tribal tensions); FLINT & 
DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 99 (detailing how the army’s lack of 
training in desert ground warfare resulted in numerous defeats and forced the army 
to rely almost exclusively on the air force). 
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to gain lands and resources, volunteered to serve in militias used to 
supplement government forces in Darfur.34 These militias, now 
known by the name given to them by their victims—Janjaweed 
(“devil on horseback”)—served to augment the regular army and 
proved to be extremely effective tools in the government’s efforts to 
crush the Darfur rebellion.35 Second, fearful of the support that the 
Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes were providing to the rebels, the 
Sudanese army and its affiliated Janjaweed militias began to 
indiscriminately target civilian villages.36 As the conflict progressed, 
a general pattern of these attacks began to emerge.37 According to the 
victims, GoS bombers usually arrived first, raining cluster-bombs 
down upon the villages.38 Following the air assaults, Janjaweed 
militias, at times accompanied by the regular army, emerged and 
surrounded the targeted village.39 Moving in, the Janjaweed 
proceeded to loot the property, execute military-aged men, rape the 
women and girls, and burn what was left, leaving the survivors to 
find their way to ever-growing displacement camps.40 It is this 
pattern of attacks that the ICC Prosecutor cited as evidence that the 
Sudanese government, led by Al-Bashir, deliberately created 
 34. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 68 (explaining that the government 
recruited militiamen not only from certain tribes within Darfur, but from Chad and 
Libya as well); FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 102-03 
(illustrating how the GoS gained the support of Arab tribes through bribing tribal 
leaders, offering development assistance to Arab communities, and updating the 
militias’ weaponry). 
 35. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 100 (defining the term “Janjaweed”); see 
also FLINT & DE WAAL, A LONG WAR, supra note 15, at 104-05 (concluding that 
the militias were integral for the government in “turning the tide” of the war). 
 36. See, e.g., Kastner, supra note 8, at 159 (positing that villages were attacked 
with little regard for the presence of rebel soldiers); see also ICID Report, supra 
note 15, ¶ 236 (finding that some 700 villages had been wholly or partially 
destroyed across the region). 
 37. See ICID Report, supra note 15, ¶ 241 (stating further that most attacks 
began at or before dawn when most of the civilians were at prayer or still asleep). 
 38. See Prunier, supra note 14, at 99-100 (recounting how the GoS used 
transport planes as bombers by rolling oil barrels filled with explosives out of the 
cargo-bays with the clear intent of these devices to impact civilians). 
 39. See generally Jennifer Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur is Genocide, 31 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 990, 1009-12 (2008) (giving a series of eye-witness accounts 
highlighting the cooperation between the Sudanese armed forces and the 
Janjaweed). 
 40. See Prunier, supra note 14, at 100, 102-03 (concluding that the ultimate 
goal of these attacks was to concentrate the populace in certain areas to prevent 
support of the rebels). 
908 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:897 
 
“conditions of life calculated to bring about [the] physical 
destruction” of a substantial part of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
ethnic groups.41
1. The United Nations and the Darfur Conflict 
The United Nations Security Council initially addressed the 
situation in Darfur in 2004.42 In September of that year, the Security 
Council authorized the Secretary-General to create a Commission of 
Inquiry to “investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur by all parties . . . .”43 In 
January 2005, the Commission of Inquiry reported its findings to the 
Security Council.44 The Commission ultimately concluded that the 
GoS had not pursued a policy of genocide in Darfur.45 The 
Commission did, however, implicate the GoS and the Janjaweed in 
“serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law amounting to crimes under international law.”46 In light of these 
findings, the Commission recommended that the Security Council 
refer the Darfur situation to the ICC.47
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute allows the Security Council, 
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, with the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security, to refer situations to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC.48 In Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005, the 
 41. See Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶ 10 (holding Al-Bashir 
personally responsible for the actions of the Sudanese armed forces and their 
Janjaweed extensions). 
 42. See S.C. Res. 1556, ¶¶ 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004) 
(prohibiting arms sales to non-state actors in Darfur and specifically mentioning 
the Janjaweed). 
 43. S.C. Res. 1564, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004) (calling on 
all parties to the conflict in Sudan to cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry). 
 44. ICID Report, supra note 15, at 1. 
 45. See id. at 4 (reporting that while two elements of the crime of genocide, the 
actus reus and the existence of a protected group, were present, the essential 
element of genocidal “intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group 
distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds,” was lacking). 
 46. See id. at 3 (finding that the GoS and Janjaweed militias committed 
numerous crimes, including indiscriminate attacks against villages, torture, killing 
of civilians, rape, and forced displacement of civilians). 
 47. See id. ¶ 569 (concluding that Sudan’s judicial system is unable to hold 
perpetrators accountable and the government authorities are disinclined to do so). 
 48. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(b); see Heyder, supra note 7, at 652-53 
(stating further that because the Court’s jurisdiction granted pursuant to an Article 
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Security Council, following the recommendations of the Commission 
of Inquiry, invoked Article 13(b) for the first time and referred the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC.49 Resolution 1593 provided the ICC 
with jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in Darfur since July 
1, 2002, the date the Rome Statute entered into force.50 By making 
this referral, the Security Council acknowledged that the events in 
Darfur represented a threat to international peace and security and, 
for the first time, designated the ICC as a major instrument in 
rectifying such threats.51
2. Previous Actions Taken by the International Criminal Court with 
Respect to Darfur 
Following the Security Council’s referral, the ICC Prosecutor 
formally opened his investigation on June 6, 2005, promising to 
focus on “the individuals who bear the greatest criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed in Darfur.”52 In April 2007, 
subsequent to the Prosecutor’s investigations, the ICC issued arrest 
warrants for Ahmad Harun, Sudan’s Minister of State for the Interior 
from 2003 to 2005, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed militia leader.53 
The ICC found that there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that 
both Harun and Ali Kushayb were responsible for war crimes and 
13(b) referral is anchored in the U.N. Charter, its jurisdiction is much stronger than 
it otherwise would be, “rendering irrelevant the consent of the state where the 
crime occurred”). 
 49. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 1; see U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. 
at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Argentina’s Statement] 
(acknowledging the important precedent set by the Security Council’s referral to 
the ICC). 
 50. Rome Statute, supra note 3; S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 1. 
 51. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, pmbl.; see Argentina’s Statement, supra note 
49, at 7 (characterizing the ICC as an “essential tool” in the international human 
rights system). 
 52. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens 
Investigation in Darfur (June 6, 2005), available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/31F3684F-43BC-4D5E-9E0A-A6A8DAC308EB.htm (calling 
on the international community to support the Office of the Prosecutor during the 
investigations). 
 53. See Prosecutor v. Harun & Al Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-
01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 
¶¶ 80-88, 95-103 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279807.PDF (citing evidence that Harun oversaw the 
recruitment of Janjaweed militias, and Kushayb commanded Janjaweed in their 
attacks upon the villages). 
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crimes against humanity committed in Darfur and requested Sudan to 
transfer both suspects to The Hague.54 Then, on July 14, 2008, in 
light of Al-Bashir’s continued obstructions of the ICC’s prosecution 
of Sudanese officials, the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for 
President Al-Bashir himself.55 In granting the Prosecutor’s warrant 
application on March 4, 2009, the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber I 
explicitly determined that Al-Bashir’s position as head of state of a 
non-state party to the Rome Statute had “no effect on the Court’s 
jurisdiction . . . .”56
For its part, Sudan has completely rejected the Court’s jurisdiction 
over its territory, and Al-Bashir has “categorically refused” to 
surrender any Sudanese national, including himself, to the ICC.57 As 
noted by the Prosecutor in his application for Al-Bashir’s arrest 
warrant, Sudan has not arrested either Ali Kushayb or Ahmad Harun, 
the latter of whom now serves as Sudan’s Minister of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs.58 In addition to Al-Bashir’s repeated 
denunciations of the ICC’s jurisdiction in Sudan, it is likely that Al-
Bashir will contest his ICC arrest warrant on the grounds that his 
Head of State immunities present a complete bar to his arrest and 
 54. See id. ¶¶ 56, 89, 94, 107 (recognizing that Resolution 1593 placed an 
international obligation on Sudan to arrest and transfer the two suspects). 
 55. See Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶¶ 44, 65, 343 (describing how 
Al-Bashir protected those who followed his orders by refusing to cooperate with 
the Court as well as his refusal to turn Harun over to the ICC). 
 56. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 40-41 (citing the Security 
Council’s referral as authority to exercise jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals 
despite Sudan’s non-party status). The Court found that it had the authority to 
disregard Al-Bashir’s position as head of state based upon four considerations. Id. 
¶ 42. First, one of the Rome Statute’s fundamental goals is to “put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes . . . .” Id. Second, Article 
27 of the Rome Statute provides that no international immunities “shall . . . exempt 
a person from criminal responsibility under [the Rome] Statute.” Id. ¶ 43. Third, 
the Court will only resort to general principles and rules of international law when 
there is an explicit lacuna in the text of the Rome Statute. Id. ¶ 44; see also Rome 
Statute, supra note 3, art. 21. Fourth, when the Security Council referred the 
Darfur situation to the ICC, it accepted that the investigation and prosecutions 
would “take place in accordance with the statutory framework provided for in the 
[Rome] Statute . . . .” Id. ¶ 45. 
 57. See Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶ 412 (alleging further that Al-
Bashir’s position as Head of State allows him the unique ability to obstruct the 
judicial proceedings in Sudan). 
 58. See id. ¶ 65 (stating further that the GoS has completely terminated any 
cooperation with the Prosecutor’s office). 
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prosecution.59 The success of this argument depends upon the nature 
and the scope of the doctrine of Head of State immunity and its 
applicability to international criminal tribunals such as the ICC.60
B. THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
Before discussing whether Al-Bashir’s position protects him from 
ICC prosecution, it is necessary to highlight the difference between 
the rules that govern the jurisdiction of a court and those that govern 
international immunity from jurisdiction.61 The concept of 
jurisdiction relates to the power of a specific court to exercise its 
authority over a specific individual.62 International immunities, on 
the other hand, serve to protect certain individuals from trial in 
foreign courts in the interests of international comity and sovereign 
equality.63 In the Arrest Warrant Case, the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) stated that “jurisdiction does not imply absence of 
immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction.”64 
Thus, in the case of Darfur, the ICC may have valid jurisdiction over 
Al-Bashir as a Sudanese national and yet still be prevented from
 59. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the 
International Criminal Court, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 38 (2005) (arguing 
that Al-Bashir and other Sudanese officials will seek to rely on the customary 
international law of absolute inviolability of Heads of State, which prevents 
foreign courts from prosecuting sovereigns when acting within their official 
duties). 
 60. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 417-18 
(asserting that the use of an international immunity before an international court 
depends upon the type of immunity and the nature of the tribunal). 
 61. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 
I.C.J. 3, 24-25 (Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case] (stressing the 
importance of distinguishing between the separate concepts of jurisdiction and 
jurisdictional immunities). 
 62. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 7, at 111 (defining jurisdiction as “the right, 
power, or authority to administer justice”). 
 63. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No. 3) (Pinochet III), (1999) 1 A.C. 147, 201, 210 (H.L.) (U.K.) 
[hereinafter Pinochet III] (emphasizing that, under international law, sovereigns 
should not pass judgment on one another). 
 64. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 24-25 (explaining further that 
even when a court’s jurisdiction is granted pursuant to an international convention, 
the availability of customary international law immunities remains). 
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exercising that jurisdiction by the international immunities he enjoys 
as Head of State.65
1. Origins and Twentieth Century Evolution of the Doctrine 
The doctrine of Head of State immunity originally arose out of the 
combined concepts of sovereign equality among states and the 
“absolute”  identification between the state itself and the leader of 
the state.66 Under this system, the Head of State, as the embodiment 
of the sovereign power of the state itself, was absolutely immune 
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts.67 This customary rule was 
based upon reciprocity between states, as well as the need to 
facilitate inter-state communication and negotiation.68
In the twentieth century, concurrent with the rise of supra-national 
institutions, cracks began to emerge in the absolute nature of the 
Head of State immunity doctrine, especially when it came to the 
most serious international crimes.69 Following the end of the Second 
World War, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal explicitly 
revoked Head of State immunity for Nazi war criminal suspects 
under its jurisdiction.70 Such efforts worked to separate the 
 65. Cf. Daniel M. Singerman, It’s Still Good to be the King: An Argument for 
Maintaining the Status Quo in Foreign Head of State Immunity, 21 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 413, 441-46 (2007) (asserting that despite the erosions caused by the 
proliferation of international criminal law, the doctrine of Head of State immunity 
is highly resilient). 
 66. See Mark A. Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of 
Prosecutions of State Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the 
United States that are not Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 463, 466-67 (2006) (positing that the earliest forms 
of Head of State immunity were based on “reciprocity, convenience, and 
practicality”); see also Singerman, supra note 65, at 418 (describing the principle 
of sovereign equality as a bar to states’ passing judgment on the actions of other 
states). 
 67. Cf. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Crunch) 116, 137-38 
(1812) (discussing the absolute inviolability of the person of the sovereign when he 
is within the territory of a consenting foreign state).
 68. See id. at 136 (declaring that states mutually benefit by communicating 
with each other). 
 69. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 66, at 482-86 (stating that the Nuremberg 
Charter was the culmination of a series of attempts to narrow the scope of the 
doctrine that began shortly after World War I). 
 70. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (“The official position of defendants, whether as 
Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be 
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individual ruler of a state from that state’s inherent sovereignty, a 
notion that increasingly became identified with the will of a state’s 
citizens rather than personified by its leader.71 As the century 
progressed and international criminal law began to solidify through 
various treaties, the use of international criminal tribunals 
proliferated, and more wrinkles emerged in the Head of State 
immunity doctrine.72
2. The Current Status of the Doctrine: Two Important Distinctions 
Unlike diplomatic immunity, which is codified in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, there is no international 
agreement delineating the parameters of Head of State immunity.73 
Thus, determining the doctrine’s current boundaries requires sifting 
through the increasingly numerous decisions emanating from both 
domestic and international courts.74 The picture that emerges from 
this process, while somewhat muddled, can be roughly characterized
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”); see 
also Singerman, supra note 65, at 429-30 (describing the post-World War II 
recognition that Heads of State were subject to international law). 
 71. See Singerman, supra note 65, at 427-28 (illustrating the shifts in 
customary international law philosophy that de-emphasized the role of the leader 
and placed him on a level of immunity similar to that enjoyed by a diplomat). 
 72. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (revoking the Head of State 
immunity doctrine as a defense to crimes prosecuted through the ICC); Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1112 Stat. 2681, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (establishing torture as an 
international crime with no qualifications on who may be held accountable, and 
creating a Committee to investigate alleged instances of torture); Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 (criminalizing genocide committed by any individual, 
regardless of whether he or she is a Head of State); The Secretary-General, Report 
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), ¶¶ 53-59, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 
3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute] (setting forth the law and principles guiding the ICTY’s 
approach to individual criminal responsibility and explicitly repudiating the 
defense of Head of State immunity). 
 73. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95 (laying out the rights and obligations of states with respect to foreign 
ambassadors); Singerman, supra note 68, at 427 (lamenting the lack of codified 
principles for Head of State immunity). 
 74. See generally Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 
409-15 (relying on numerous cases, both domestic and international, to outline the 
extent of immunity ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae). 
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by two important distinctions that dominate the current debate about 
when Head of State immunity is applicable.75
a. The Immunity Ratione Personae and Immunity Ratione Materiae 
Distinction 
The first of these distinctions is between personal immunity 
(immunity ratione personae) and act of state immunity (immunity 
ratione materiae), and serves to separate the immunities available to 
sitting Heads of State from those available to former Heads of 
State.76 Immunity ratione personae is absolute and attaches to an 
incumbent Head of State’s person while he is in office, rendering 
him completely immune and inviolable from prosecution in foreign 
courts, even when he is suspected of committing crimes against 
humanity.77 Further, this complete prosecutorial bar applies 
regardless of whether the Head of State committed the acts in 
question in his official capacity.78 Immunity ratione personae is 
justified by the recognition that the international system is dependent 
upon peaceful cooperation between states and, as the primary 
representatives of states, Heads of State must be allowed to conduct 
relations without fear of prosecution.79
 75. See Singerman, supra note 65, at 427. 
 76. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity 
from Jurisdiction, ¶ 18(b) (May 31, 2004) (presenting Professor Diane 
Orentlicher’s arguments from her amicus brief that stress the need to differentiate 
between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae when 
deciding whether Charles Taylor, as a Head of State, should be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”)); see also Akande, 
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 409 (highlighting the difference 
between the “broad” immunity ratione personae that some officials are granted 
because of the office they hold, and the more limited immunity ratione materiae 
that attaches only to an individual’s official acts). 
 77. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 201-02 (explaining further that the 
immunity of a sitting Head of State is the “same immunity as the state itself”); 
Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 24-25 (finding that there is no exception to 
the customary international law of absolute immunity ratione personae for crimes 
against humanity). 
 78. Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 22 (stating that when immunity 
ratione personae is found there is “no distinction” between official and private 
acts, and the immunity covers acts performed by the individual before taking 
office). 
 79. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 409-10 
(noting that this immunity is afforded only to that small group of officials with the 
responsibility of conducting foreign relations, including (1) heads of State, (2) 
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In contrast, immunity ratione materiae is more limited in scope 
but broader in the number of officials that it protects.80 Immunity 
ratione materiae attaches to the acts of state representatives 
performed in their official capacity.81 Unlike immunity ratione 
personae, immunity ratione materiae applies to the acts of state 
officials that were conducted in their official capacity even after the 
individuals have left office.82 This immunity is justified by the theory 
that official actions are not done to benefit the individual, but rather 
are performed on behalf of the state.83 The purposes of immunity 
ratione materiae, therefore, are to protect the individual from 
responsibility for state actions and to prevent foreign courts from 
passing judgment on a sovereign state by prosecuting those who act 
on its behalf.84 While in office, Heads of State possess both 
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae.85
b. The Distinction between the Availability of Head of State Immunities in 
Domestic Courts Versus their Use in International Courts 
In the Arrest Warrant Case, the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) held that a Belgian arrest warrant issued for the incumbent 
Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo on charges of 
crimes against humanity violated international law because it “failed 
to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction” enjoyed by the 
heads of government, and (3) foreign ministers). 
 80. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 148 (holding that immunity ratione 
materiae does not extend to official acts that violate jus cogens norms); Akande, 
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 412-13 (asserting that immunity 
ratione materiae extends to lower-level state officials whose positions do not 
warrant immunity ratione personae. 
 81. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 202 (finding that any state official has 
immunity in foreign courts with respect to his official actions). 
 82. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 123 (stating that upon leaving office, an 
official’s immunity ratione materiae becomes his only protection from 
prosecution, regardless of whether he had previously been granted immunity 
ratione personae). 
 83. See id. at 109-10 (declaring further that immunity ratione materiae applies 
to all conduct that is “directly attributable to state action”). 
 84. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 413; see also 
Simbeye, supra note 10, at 123 (describing the “two pronged” protection of 
immunity ratione materiae, which includes immunity for the individual and the 
“non-justiciability for the act itself”). 
 85. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 109. 
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Minister.86 This decision made clear that, at the time, under 
international law domestic courts could not exercise jurisdiction over 
sitting foreign ministers or Heads of State who possess valid 
immunity ratione personae, even when they are charged with crimes 
against humanity.87 The power of domestic courts to adjudicate over 
former Heads of State, however, has been greatly enhanced in recent 
years.88 Although still somewhat in flux, it seems settled that 
domestic courts can exercise jurisdiction over former Heads of State 
for violations of international criminal law they committed while in 
office.89
In the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ also recognized that the 
limitations that a Head of State’s immunities impose on domestic 
courts would not always present a difficulty to certain international 
criminal tribunals.90 Indeed, the enacting documents of various 
international courts, including the ICC, contain provisions that 
explicitly make a suspect’s international immunities irrelevant.91 In 
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(“SCSL”) concluded that because the court was “part of the 
machinery of international justice” with jurisdiction over 
international crimes committed in Sierra Leone, it possessed the 
 86. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 33 (declaring further that 
Belgium was obligated to cancel the arrest warrant and inform international 
authorities that it had done so). 
 87. See id. at 22 (finding that sitting Heads of State, heads of government, and 
foreign ministers are afforded absolute immunity and inviolability while they are 
in office). 
 88. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 25 (recognizing exceptions to 
the immunities granted to a former foreign minister, including that he does not 
have immunity from suit in courts in his home state, he cannot claim immunity if 
immunity is waived by his home state, he can be subject to the criminal courts of 
another state for “private” acts committed while in office, and where international 
courts have jurisdiction, he can be forced to participate in their criminal 
proceedings). 
 89. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 148 (determining that in the light of the 
International Convention against Torture, former heads of state do not have 
immunity for official acts of torture); see also Akande, International Law 
Immunities, supra note 11, at 413-15 (stating that immunity ratione materiae does 
not apply to an individual charged with an international crime); Summers, supra 
note 66, at 480-81 (finding an exception to immunity ratione materiae in the case 
of “core” international crimes). 
 90. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 61, at 25 (listing the ICTY, ICTR, and 
ICC as possible venues). 
 91. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (eliminating both immunity ratione 
personae and immunity ratione materiae as defenses before the ICC). 
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authority to disregard the immunities of Charles Taylor, the 
incumbent Liberian Head of State at the time the SCSL issued his 
arrest warrant.92 In light of the above, it is apparent that international 
criminal tribunals have much greater authority under international 
law than domestic courts to prosecute sitting Heads of State.93 As the 
case of Al-Bashir illustrates, however, the assumption that an 
international court’s judicial power extends to all Heads of State in 
every situation is subject to several caveats. The most important 
caveat is whether the individual’s state is bound by that court’s 
rulings.94
II. ANALYSIS 
The Rome Statute was enacted with the dual objectives of 
eliminating impunity for the perpetrators of crimes that “shock the 
conscience of humanity,” while guaranteeing respect for the internal 
affairs of states.95 These goals led to the creation of a juridical 
system tasked with the sometimes competing mandates of holding 
accountable those individuals most culpable of international crimes, 
while ensuring that doing so does not infringe upon the rights of 
states.96 The situation in Sudan, and especially the warrant for Al-
Bashir, provides a unique opportunity to observe the ICC’s ability to 
walk this fine and sometimes precarious line between the need for 
individual accountability and respect for state sovereignty.97
 92. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity 
from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 37-39, 53 (May 31, 2004) (determining that the SCSL had 
this authority because its treaty was enacted by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter). 
 93. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 91 (suggesting that even though immunities 
are not irrelevant to international courts, the “vertical” relationship between the 
international tribunal and the state limits the state’s sovereignty). 
 94. See, e.g., Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 418 
(concluding that before an international court has the authority to disregard an 
individual’s immunities, the tribunal’s founding instruments must provide for the 
removal of immunities, and the individual’s state must be bound by those 
instruments). 
 95. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. 
 96. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of 
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 
1997, ¶ 40 (Oct. 29, 1997) (recognizing the reality that international tribunals take 
into account the sovereignty of independent states). 
 97. See Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court 
and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity 16-18 (2008) 
918 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:897 
 
A. THE ROME STATUTE AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 
1593 GRANT THE ICC POWER TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER 
ACTS COMMITTED IN SUDAN 
Before the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a specific crime, its 
authority over the situation in which the crime was committed must 
be activated by one of the three “trigger mechanisms” outlined in the 
Rome Statute.98 Article 13 of the Rome Statute allows triggering of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction by a referral from a State Party, a Security 
Council referral, or through the Prosecutor’s independent initiation 
of an investigation.99 Once the ICC’s authority over a general 
situation has been triggered, the Court is also required, sua sponte, to 
verify that it has jurisdiction over a specific individual before it.100
In the case of Sudan, the Security Council triggered the ICC’s 
authority by referral in Resolution 1593.101 The extent of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Sudan, therefore, requires a 
concurrent reading of the applicable Rome Statute provisions and 
Security Council Resolution 1593.102 Thus, in determining whether it 
has specific jurisdiction over Al-Bashir, the ICC must first establish 
(stating that the Rome Statute “challenges traditional views on state sovereignty” 
by placing constraints on sovereignty to allow the ICC to pursue its mandate). 
 98. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13; see also Philippe Kirsch, QC & Darryl 
Robinson, Referral by States Parties, in The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary 619, 619 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) 
(describing the term “trigger mechanism” as “the ability to direct the Court’s 
attention to events in a particular time and place, . . . with a view to initiating an 
exercise of jurisdiction over those events”). 
 99. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13. 
 100. See id. art. 19(1) (providing further that the Court, after establishing that it 
has jurisdiction, may decide to make a determination of the admissibility of a 
specific case); see also Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 35 
(acknowledging that Article 19(1) requires the Court to establish its jurisdiction in 
every case brought before it). 
 101. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 1 (using Chapter VII authority to do 
so). 
 102. See Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Referral and Deferral by the 
Security Council, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, supra note 98, at 627, 634 (asserting that while a Security Council 
referral does not have any impact on the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the 
binding nature of Security Council actions under Chapter VII allows the Security 
Council to extend the Court’s jurisdiction over the territory or nationals of a state 
that has not ratified the Rome Statute); see also Heyder, supra note 7, at 654 
(arguing that an in-depth analysis of Resolution 1593 is necessary in order to 
determine the extent of the Court’s mandate in Sudan). 
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that Resolution 1593 permits the Rome Statute’s immunity-stripping 
Article 27 to apply to the Head of State of Sudan, a non-consenting, 
non-State Party to the Rome Statute.103
1. The Rome Statute and Security Council Resolution 1593 Provide 
the Legal Basis for ICC Jurisdiction over Sudanese Nationals for 
Crimes Committed in Sudan 
Once the ICC’s authority over a general situation is activated 
through one of the Article 13 trigger mechanisms, the two concepts 
of jurisdiction and admissibility work to limit the ICC’s ability to 
adjudicate specific cases.104 In this scheme, the ICC’s jurisdiction 
denotes the four legal parameters—“subject matter (jurisdiction 
ratione materiae), time (jurisdiction ratione temporis), space 
(jurisdiction ratione loci)[,] and . . . individuals (jurisdiction ratione 
personae)”—over which the Court may properly exercise its 
authority.105 In contrast, the concept of admissibility, enshrined in 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, arises when the ICC must determine 
whether it should exercise its authority in a specific case over which 
the ICC possesses jurisdiction.106 The structure of the Rome Statute 
provides that either concept—jurisdiction or admissibility—may be
 103. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (stripping those accused of crimes 
under the Rome Statute of immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione 
materiae, regardless of their position in a government). 
 104. Compare id. arts. 5, 11, 12 (establishing the limits of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over subject matter, time, space, and individuals), with id. art. 17 
(listing the cases when the Court should determine that a specific case is 
inadmissible, including when a state has already initiated proceedings over the 
accused). 
 105. Kim, supra note 7, at 111. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 
5, 11, 12 (detailing the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, jurisdiction ratione 
temporis, jurisdiction ratione loci, and jurisdiction ratione personae). 
 106. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1). Article 17 sets forth four 
instances when the Court will find a specific case inadmissible: when a case is 
already being prosecuted by a state with valid jurisdiction, unless that state is 
“unwilling or unable” to “genuinely” carry out the prosecution; when a case has 
been previously investigated by a state with valid jurisdiction and that state has 
decided not to prosecute; when the person in question “has already been tried for 
conduct which is the subject of the complaint”; and when the case “is not of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.” Id. See, e.g., Kim, supra 
note 7, at 111 (recognizing that there may be situations where the ICC has 
jurisdiction over an issue, but would find cases arising from it inadmissible 
because domestic proceedings had already been initiated). 
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contested by an accused individual or a state with valid 
jurisdiction.107
a. The ICC Jurisdiction Granted under the Rome Statute is Insufficient to 
Prosecute Nationals of Non-Consenting, Non-State Parties 
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”) provides that a treaty “does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third State without its consent.”108 Furthermore, a treaty 
cannot create an obligation for a non-State Party unless that state 
“expressly accepts that obligation in writing.”109 Nothing in the 
Rome Statute violates the VCLT because no article creates 
obligations for non-State Parties.110 Indeed, Article 12 of the Rome 
Statute provides that when a State Party has referred a case to the 
ICC or when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation of his own 
volition, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction if the alleged crimes 
were committed on the territory of a State Party or if the alleged 
perpetrators are nationals of a State Party.111
Thus, in the case of Sudan, it is evident that the plain text of the 
Rome Statute, without more, is insufficient to support the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals for crimes committed in 
Sudan.112 Although Sudan initially signed the Rome Statute, it never 
ratified the agreement.113 In addition, on August 27, 2008, the GoS 
 107. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 19(2) (providing that a state may 
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the state is investigating or 
prosecuting the individual). 
 108. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 109. Id. art. 35. 
 110. See Chibueze, supra note 13, at 205-06 (arguing that the text of the Rome 
Statute does not violate the Vienna Convention because the Rome Statute itself 
does not create obligations for non-State Parties—it only allows them the option of 
consenting to ICC jurisdiction). 
 111. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(2); see Chibueze, supra note 13, at 203-
04 (asserting that, absent a Security Council referral, the Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited to the territory or nationals of State Parties). 
 112. See Kim, supra note 7, at 131 (finding that the extent of the Court’s 
authority with respect to non-State Parties is to “invite” them to assist the Court). 
 113. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
with the Secretary General, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/X
VIII-10.en.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (listing all state accessions, reservations, 
or withdrawals from the Rome Statute). 
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sent the Secretary General of the United Nations a communication 
stating that “Sudan does not intend to become a party to the Rome 
Statute. Accordingly, Sudan has no legal obligation arising from its 
signature on 8 September 2000.”114 Because Sudan has specifically 
withheld consent to obligations under the Rome Statute, the VCLT 
bars the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on Sudanese 
territory by Sudanese nationals without some further grant of 
authority independent of the Rome Statute.115
b. The Authority Needed for ICC Jurisdiction in Sudan is Derived from 
Security Council Resolution 1593 
The additional required authority is derived from Security Council 
Resolution 1593, which invokes Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in 
referring the Darfur situation to the ICC.116 The U.N. Charter 
requires that all U.N. Member States carry out decisions made by the 
Security Council.117 Therefore, when the operative paragraphs of a 
Security Council resolution made pursuant to Chapter VII authority 
indicate a direct order, the resolution becomes “binding as law and 
mandatory as policy” upon those states the resolution is directed 
 114. The Secretary-General, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Sudan: Notification, C.N.612.2008.TREATIES-6 (Depositary Notification) (Aug. 
27, 2008), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2008/CN.612. 
2008-Eng.pdf. 
 115. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12 (precluding the exercise of jurisdiction 
in the territory or over nationals of non-State Parties to the Statute without express 
consent from the non-State Party); see also Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and 
Limits, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 618, 618-19 (2003) (describing the three instances 
when the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-Parties: (1) as a result 
of a Security Council referral, (2) when non-Party nationals have committed 
crimes in the territory of a State Party, or the territory of a state that has consented 
to the Court’s jurisdiction, and (3) when a non-State Party has consented to the 
Court’s jurisdiction over a certain crime). 
 116. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, pmbl., ¶ 1 (recognizing the validity of the 
Security Council’s actions under Chapter VII following a determination that Sudan 
“continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security”); see also 
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(b) (allowing the court to exercise its 
jurisdiction when a “situation . . . is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”). 
 117. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the 
present Charter.”). 
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towards.118 With respect to Sudan, it is clear that Resolution 1593 is a 
direct order that obligates Sudan, as a U.N. Member State, to 
cooperate with the ICC.119 The second operative paragraph of 
Resolution 1593 states that “the Government of Sudan and all other 
parties to the conflict in Darfur[] shall cooperate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution.”120 In reliance on the wording of 
Resolution 1593, and citing the authority derived from the U.N. 
Charter, the ICC concluded that Sudan has an international 
obligation to cooperate with the Court’s decisions emanating from 
the situation in Darfur.121
As Sudan is under an international obligation to cooperate with the 
ICC and the Prosecutor, it follows that Sudan must also respect and 
enforce the Prosecutor’s decisions about whom to prosecute.122 
 118. Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law: 
Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 88 (1995) (discussing the sources of state 
obligations to comply with requests from the ICTY and stating further that when 
the Security Council issues a resolution framed as a command by using the word 
“decides,” that resolution becomes a legal order binding upon U.N. Member 
States); cf. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of 
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 
1997, ¶ 47 (Oct. 29, 1997) (determining that when the Security Council created the 
ICTY using its Chapter VII authority, it established a “vertical relationship” 
between the ICTY and states that confers primacy on the ICTY over domestic 
courts). 
 119. See Joyner, supra note 118, at 88 (explaining that Security Council 
resolutions with a direct imperative included in the operative paragraphs are 
binding as law); see also Kim, supra note 7, at 114 (stressing the “mandatory 
nature” of Security Council actions made under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter). 
 120. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
 121. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 241-248 (noting further 
that if Sudan chooses not to comply, the Court may refer the lack of compliance 
back to the Security Council which may then choose to take further action as 
authorized under the U.N. Charter); see also Prosecutor v. Harun & Al Abd-Al-
Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application 
under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ¶ 16 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279807.PDF (“[T]he Court may, where a 
situation is referred to it by the Security Council, exercise jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in the territory of States which are not Party to the [Rome] Statute and 
by nationals of States not Party to the [Rome] Statute.”). 
 122. See Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 242, 247 (highlighting 
the fact that Al-Bashir’s prosecution stemmed from the Security Council’s referral 
of the Darfur situation); Udombana, supra note 59, at 23-24 (arguing that when the 
Security Council has referred a situation to the ICC, the Prosecutor is given the 
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Unlike when the ICC’s jurisdiction is triggered by a State Party 
referral or when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation, there is no 
subsequent article in the Rome Statute that defines the processes or 
powers that flow from a Security Council referral.123 It has been 
argued that this was a purposeful omission that allows the Security 
Council the widest latitude to act under Chapter VII and maintains 
the Court’s independence by giving the Prosecutor the final say over 
which individuals, if any, to prosecute pursuant to the grant of 
jurisdiction.124
Read concurrently, the jurisdictional articles of the Rome Statute 
and Security Council Resolution 1593 provide sufficient 
authorization for the Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute 
Sudanese nationals for crimes committed in Sudan.125 Resolution 
1593, with its Chapter VII underpinnings, provides the Prosecutor 
with the broad mandate to act in Sudan, while the Rome Statute 
supplies the ability to target specific individuals for the commission 
of specific crimes.126 However, additional jurisdictional difficulties 
arise when the alleged perpetrator of these crimes happens also to be 
the sitting Head of State.127
final decision over whether to initiate the Court’s jurisdiction over a specific case). 
 123. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 14 (stating that a State Party may refer 
a situation to the Prosecutor in order to determine whether specific individuals 
should be charged with crimes under the Rome Statute); id. art. 15 (listing the 
powers of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation on his own and the process to 
follow). 
 124. See Udombana, supra note 59, at 16-17 (arguing that while the Security 
Council has wide power to determine what actions to take under Chapter VII, 
when the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, the Prosecutor retains 
discretion over whom to prosecute). 
 125. Cf. Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, supra 
note 115, at 618 (asserting that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of 
non-State Parties when the Security Council has referred the situation to the 
Court). 
 126. See Simbeye, supra note 10, at 19 (highlighting that in the case of a 
Security Council referral, non-State Parties to the Rome Statute may nevertheless 
be bound by its provisions because of their U.N. membership and the obligations 
that flow from it). 
 127. See Claire de Than & Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and 
Human Rights 52-53 (2003) (describing the difficulties faced by a court attempting 
to indict a current Head of State including his “technical” identification with the 
state itself). 
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2. Resolution 1593 and Relevant International Cases Provide the 
Necessary Authority for the ICC to Apply the Rome Statute’s 
Immunity-Stripping Provisions to Al-Bashir 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that an “official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government . . . shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility.”128 Further, 
“[i]mmunities . . . which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the 
ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”129 Taken 
together, these two provisions are intended to strip both immunity 
ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae from suspects 
brought before the ICC.130 Thus, at first, it seems evident that if the 
ICC has valid jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals, Al-Bashir’s 
position as Head of State should not have any impact upon the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over him. 
a. Arguments Against the ICC’s Possessing the Power to Remove Al-
Bashir’s Head of State Immunities 
The automatic conclusion that Al-Bashir’s immunities are not 
relevant before the ICC somewhat understates the nature and the 
purpose of customary international law immunities as they relate to 
courts established by a treaty in two important ways.131 First, it 
ignores the fact that although international immunities are designed 
to shield individuals from foreign jurisdictions, the purpose of these 
immunities has always been to protect states from judicial 
proceedings to which they have not consented.132 The ultimate owner
 128. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27(1). 
 129. Id. art. 27(2). 
 130. See Kim, supra note 7, at 162 (stating that the drafters of the Rome Statute 
easily came to agreement that all suspects before the court would be treated 
equally, regardless of their official positions). 
 131. See generally Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 
415-19 (finding that the use of immunities as a prosecutorial bar in international 
tribunals depends on the nature of the statute creating the tribunal, and whether the 
state concerned is bound by it). 
 132. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, at 201 (emphasizing that state 
representatives are afforded immunity in foreign courts in “recognition of the 
dignity” of their home state). 
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of the immunity, therefore, is not the individual but the state of 
which he is a national.133
Second, the above conclusion does not take sufficient account of 
the fact that the ICC, unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) or the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), was established through a treaty and 
not through a Chapter VII action taken by the United Nations.134 This 
is an important distinction because the power of an international 
court to remove immunities is dependent upon the mechanism under 
which it was created.135 It is generally accepted that when the 
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
creates an international tribunal such as the ICTY or the ICTR, that 
tribunal is empowered to disregard the immunities of nationals of all 
U.N. Member States.136 This power derives from the binding nature 
of Security Council decisions and the notion that Member States, by 
virtue of their ratification of the U.N. Charter, have indirectly 
assented to the removal of immunities in such occasions.137 When, 
however, an international court has been created through a treaty 
(like the ICC), its power to remove immunities is somewhat more 
suspect.138 If this were not the case a small number of states could 
 133. Cf. Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to the International 
Court of Justice in a Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning an International Arrest 
Warrant Issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone against the Liberian 
President (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/ 
index.php?pr=1027&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1 (detailing the argument of the Liberian 
government, which alleged that the arrest warrant issued by the SCSL for Charles 
Taylor while he was the sitting president infringed upon Liberian sovereignty and 
violated international law). 
 134. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 3 (establishing the ICC), with ICTY 
Statute, supra note 72, ¶ 1 (recognizing Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) of 
February 22, 1993, which provided the basis for the ICTY), and S.C. Res. 955, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] 
(establishing the ICTR). 
 135. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 34-35 (May 31, 2004) (acknowledging that the 
powers of the SCSL are dependent upon the fact that the SCSL was created by a 
treaty between the Security Council and Sierra Leone, and not directly by the 
Security Council). 
 136. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 417 (stating 
that the ICTY and the ICTR possess the power to “remov[e] immunity with respect 
to practically all states”). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. (asserting that immunities were designed to bar states from 
interfering in the internal affairs of other states through prosecutions, and this 
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create, via treaty, “an international criminal court for the purpose, or 
with the effect, of circumventing the jurisdictional limitations 
incumbent upon national courts.”139 Although the Rome Statute does 
have a significant number of State Parties, its ratification is not 
universal, and so determining whether the ICC has the authority to 
disregard the international immunities of non-State Party nationals 
must be done with care.140
b. Arguments in Favor of the ICC’s Power to Strip Al-Bashir’s Immunities 
All of the above is not to say that the ICC cannot disregard the 
immunities of non-State Party officials in certain situations; it only 
shows that the Rome Statute does not grant the ICC automatic 
authority to do so.141 The ICC is unique among international 
tribunals in that, although it was created by a treaty, Article 13(b) 
allows the Security Council to use the ICC as a tool to maintain 
international peace and security in specific situations.142 When the 
Security Council chooses to do so, at least with respect to the 
immunities of nationals of the state (or states) in question, the 
Security Council puts the ICC on equal footing with the ad hoc 
tribunals.143 This is premised on three legal underpinnings apart from 
justification holds true even if the prosecuting states seek to exercise jurisdiction 
through a united group). 
 139. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Submissions of the 
Amicus Curiae on Head of State Immunity by Philippe Sands, ¶ 78 (Oct. 23, 
2003), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/27928AD2-4ECB-4611-
95B7-F9F0AE2DBF24/0/Sands.pdf (urging the SCSL to conclude that, because it 
is an international tribunal similar in competence to the other criminal tribunals, it 
has the authority to disregard the immunities of Charles Taylor). 
 140. See Singerman, supra note 65, at 441 (pointing out that only 104 of the 102 
United Nations Member States have ratified or acceded to both the Rome Statue 
and the ICC). 
 141. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12 (limiting the Court’s power to the 
nationals or territory of State Parties in the absence of a Security Council referral). 
 142. See id. art. 13(b). 
 143. Cf. Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 45 (positing that, by 
making the Article 13(b) referral, the Security Council understood that any 
prosecutions would be conducted in accordance with the Rome Statute’s 
provisions); Dapo Akande, The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State 
Immune from ICC Prosecution? 3 (Oxford Transnational Justice Research, 
Working Paper No. 6, 2008), available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/ 
Akande.pdf (raising the possibility that when the Security Council obligated Sudan 
to cooperate with the ICC in Resolution 1593, this canceled Al-Bashir’s 
immunities). 
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the Rome Statute: the mandatory nature of the U.N. Charter, the 
ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant Case, and the SCSL’s decision 
regarding immunities in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor.144
It is clear that the ICC, unlike the ICTY or ICTR, was created by a 
treaty and not by a Security Council resolution. The ICC, therefore, 
normally operates as an independent entity without inherent authority 
to disregard the immunities conferred by non-States Parties of the 
Rome Statute.145 However, because the Security Council acted under 
Chapter VII in referring the Darfur situation to the ICC, the Court’s 
jurisdiction over Sudanese nationals is anchored in the U.N. 
Charter.146 This anchor, and the international obligation that 
Resolution 1593 places on Sudan to cooperate with the Court, 
position the ICC in a vertical relationship with Sudan, permitting the 
Court to disregard Al-Bashir’s immunities without violating 
international law.147
 144. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (requiring Member States to comply with Security 
Council resolutions); Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 64, at 25-26 (insinuating 
that international courts such as the ICC could remove immunities in the proper 
circumstances); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 1, 42, 53, 60 (May 31, 2004) (denying Taylor’s 
motion to quash his indictment based on Head of State immunity after determining 
that the SCSL was an international criminal court and, as a result, Taylor’s position 
as incumbent Head of State was not a bar to his prosecution). 
 145. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. (recognizing the independence of 
the Court with respect to the U.N. system); see also Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, 
supra note 3, ¶ 240 (noting that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute and has 
therefore not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory); cf. Akande, 
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 417 (presenting the ICTY and 
ICTR as examples of Security Council-created mechanisms that can remove the 
immunities of U.N. Member State nationals). 
 146. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (allowing the Security Council to take action 
when peace is threatened or breached or an act of aggression has occurred, and 
providing the Security Council with the means to do so, both through authorizing 
the use of force and through other measures); Heyder, supra note 7, at 652-53 
(asserting that when the ICC’s jurisdiction over a situation is based on a Chapter 
VII referral from the Security Council, the Court’s jurisdiction is universal, and the 
state’s consent is irrelevant). 
 147. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (ordering the government of Sudan to 
cooperate with and provide assistance to the ICC); Al-Bashir Warrant Decision, 
supra note 3, ¶¶ 241-247 (asserting that although Sudan has not ratified the Rome 
Statute, it remains under an international obligation to cooperate with the ICC 
because of the binding language of Resolution 1593 and Sudan’s duties under the 
U.N. Charter); see also Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity 
from Jurisdiction, ¶ 38 (determining that when the Security Council creates a court 
with the goal of keep international peace, it may force the United Nations to 
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The ICC’s power to remove Al-Bashir’s immunities by applying 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute is reinforced by the Arrest Warrant 
Case.148 There, the ICJ went to great lengths to separate “immunity” 
from “impunity” and specifically mentioned Article 27 when putting 
forth the ICC as a venue for holding state officials accountable if 
international immunities prevented domestic courts from 
prosecution.149 Further, in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, the Appeals 
Chamber held that the SCSL, as an international court created by a 
treaty between the Security Council and Sierra Leone, possessed 
authority to remove Taylor’s international immunities, even though 
he was an incumbent Head of State at the time his arrest warrant was 
issued.150
Together, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 and the Rome 
Statute provide the foundation for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction 
over Sudanese nationals.151 These two documents, reinforced by 
relevant international case law, provide the ICC with the power to 
ignore Al-Bashir’s immunities as Head of State and issue a warrant 
participate). 
 148. See generally Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 64, at 25-26 (stating clearly 
that the Court is not barred from having jurisdiction if Article 27 is applied). 
 149. See id. at 25 (stating that immunity does not “exonerate” an individual of 
criminal responsibility and listing the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC as valid venues 
for holding an incumbent foreign minister accused of war crimes accountable, if 
these tribunals had jurisdiction). 
 150. See Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 38 (underscoring the importance of the fact that the Security 
Council was acting under its Chapter VII authority when it decided to enter into 
the agreement with Sierra Leone); see also Micaela Frulli, The Question of Charles 
Taylor’s Immunity: Still in Search of a Balanced Application of Personal 
Immunities?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1118, 1120-21 (2004) (describing that while 
the Security Council did not vest the SCSL with Chapter VII authority, the judges 
found that because the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII when the 
SCSL was established, this was enough to provide the court with an international 
character). Frulli criticizes the SCSL judges for, once having established that the 
SCSL is an international tribunal created under the context of Chapter VII, failing 
to utilize Chapter VII authority as a basis for disregarding Taylor’s immunities, 
instead relying on the distinction between national and international courts. Id. at 
1123; J. Peter Pham, A Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 37, 101-02 (arguing that the 
SCSL’s decision on immunities was one of the court’s most significant 
accomplishments). 
 151. See supra Part II.A.1 (concluding that the ICC’s jurisdiction over Darfur is 
valid in light of the mandatory nature of Security Council Resolution 1593). 
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for his arrest.152 Now that the ICC judges have decided to pursue this 
course of action, the question becomes how Al-Bashir’s warrant can 
be executed.153
B. THE ICC’S RELIANCE ON DOMESTIC PROCESSES TO CARRY OUT 
ITS WARRANTS AND THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY RESOLUTION 
1593 MAY PREVENT THE EXECUTION OF AN ARREST WARRANT 
BECAUSE OF AL-BASHIR’S HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITIES 
Although the ICC, as demonstrated above, has the legal authority 
to prosecute President Al-Bashir for crimes committed in Darfur, its 
ability to do so hinges on the enforceability of any warrant issued for 
his arrest.154 The Rome Statute prevents trials in absentia; therefore 
Al-Bashir’s physical presence in The Hague is essential before the 
Court can move on to the merits of the Prosecutor’s case.155 The 
ICC, however, does not have any enforcement mechanism of its 
own, and as a result, the Court is completely dependent upon states 
to carry out arrests on its behalf.156 Many commentators have 
worried that the Court’s lack of independent enforcement 
capabilities, along with the apparent disparities between Articles 27 
and 98 of the Rome Statute, could lead to situations in which the ICC 
is unable to initiate trials against those most responsible for 
 152. See supra Part II.A.2 (arguing that recent cases in the ICJ and the SCSL 
support the finding that the ICC has the authority to lift Al-Bashir’s Head of State 
immunities). 
 153. Pondai Bamu, Head of State Immunity and ICC: Can Bashir be 
Prosecuted? 2 (Oxford Transnational Justice Research, Working Paper No. 7, 
2008), available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/BamuF.pdf (raising 
practical difficulties the ICC faces if it decided to issue a warrant for Al-Bashir, 
including the reliance on states for enforcement of ICC warrants and previous 
failures to apprehend ICC suspects in Uganda). 
 154. Cf. Chibueze, supra note 13, at 209-11 (commenting that the effectiveness 
of the ICC depends on states’ fulfilling their obligations to arrest and surrender 
those accused of crimes to the ICC). 
 155. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 63(1) (“The accused shall be present 
during the trial.”). But see Kim, supra note 7, at 212 (determining that the presence 
of the accused is only required at the trial, and not during pretrial proceedings). 
 156. See Nick Donovan, Introduction: Enforcement of International Criminal 
Law, in Aegis Trust, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law 3, 9 (Nick 
Donovan ed., 2009), available at http://www.aegistrust.org/images/PDFs/ 
enforcement_of_international_criminal_law.pdf (characterizing the dearth of 
enforcement capabilities as the “‘Achilles’ heel’” of the ICC); Kirsch, supra note 
13, at 291 (stating that trials before the Court can only occur if states cooperate 
with the Court’s requests). 
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international crimes.157 Sudan’s refusal to apprehend Ahmed Harun 
and Ali Kushayb despite ICC arrest warrants shows that such 
concerns are especially pertinent in any discussion about the 
possibilities of trying Al-Bashir in The Hague.158
Practically speaking, there are four primary ways that Al-Bashir 
could appear before the ICC judges in response to his arrest warrant. 
First, Al-Bashir could turn himself in to the Prosecutor.159 Given Al-
Bashir’s animosity toward the ICC and rejection of the charges 
against him, this is extremely unlikely.160 Second, the Sudanese 
authorities could arrest and extradite him to The Hague.161 Even 
though Resolution 1593 places an obligation on Sudan to comply 
with the Court’s requests,162 and there appear to be some anti-Al-
Bashir rumblings in Khartoum,163 without a complete regime change 
this option seems out of the question.164 Third, Al-Bashir could be 
 157. See, e.g., Simbeye, supra note 10, at 2 (lamenting that while Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute makes an individual’s official status irrelevant before the ICC, 
Article 98 makes official status pertinent when states are acting to apprehend that 
individual); Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 420 (noting 
that because the ICC does not have the power to arrest suspects on its own it must 
rely on states to do so, in which case the official immunities enjoyed by the suspect 
could become relevant to national court proceedings); Chibueze, supra note 13, at 
210 (asserting that the Court’s credibility could be damaged if states failed or 
refused to enforce the Court’s warrants). 
 158. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking 
Global Justice, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 222 (2007-2008) (underscoring 
that in failing to arrest and surrender Harun and Kushayb, Sudan is in violation of 
its legal obligations). 
 159. See Flint & de Waal, This Prosecution Will Endanger the People, supra 
note 6 (stating that an ICC warrant for Al-Bashir will be effective only if Al-Bashir 
surrenders, is arrested, or is ousted from power). 
 160. See UN Split Over Darfur Peace Force, BBC News, July 29, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7530501.stm (reporting that Al-Bashir is 
unworried by the ICC’s “politically motivated” charges). 
 161. See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 158, at 222 (recognizing that while the 
Sudanese government has discussed the possible surrender of Ahmad Harun, no 
similar discussions have been held with regard to Al-Bashir, nor is it likely that 
they will). 
 162. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (obligating Sudan to cooperate with 
the ICC). 
 163. See Amber Henshaw, Will Warrant Tip Sudan into Abyss?, BBC News, 
Mar. 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7887007.stm (reporting rumors of a 
coup against Al-Bashir but noting that members of Al-Bashir’s party continue to 
support him for now). 
 164. See A Dilemma over Darfur, supra note 6 (describing how Al-Bashir’s 
ruling party has called the prosecutor’s charges “blackmail” and threatened more 
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arrested and extradited by an international force in Sudan with the 
specific mandate to do so.165 Alhough there is a U.N. force in Darfur 
(“UNAMID”), its mandate is currently limited to protecting civilians 
and supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement.166 Fourth, Al-Bashir could be arrested pursuant to an 
ICC warrant while in the territory of a third state, and then extradited 
from that state to The Hague for trial.167 Although this option 
presents serious difficulties, it has historical precedent—both Charles 
Taylor and Ugarte Pinochet were arrested in third states and then 
extradited to stand trial.168 The viability of this fourth option is 
discussed for the remainder of this Section. 
1. The Conflict between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute 
Create the Possibility that an ICC Warrant for Al-Bashir Will Be 
Unenforceable While He is in Power 
The first concern about the enforceability of Al-Bashir’s arrest 
warrant is created by the structure of the Rome Statute itself.169 
Article 27 of the Statute provides that neither the official capacity 
violence in Darfur should the ICC issue a warrant). But see Flint & de Waal, This 
Prosecution Will Endanger the People, supra note 6 (asserting the unlikelihood of 
a regime change in Sudan given Al-Bashir’s grip on power and the weakness of the 
political opposition). 
 165. See generally Han-Ru Zhou, The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by 
International Forces, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 202, 205-08 (2006) (outlining the legal 
rationale of the ICTY in legitimizing the use of multi-national forces, including 
NATO, to enforce the court’s arrest warrants). 
 166. See S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007) (declaring 
further that UNAMID must fulfill its mandate “without prejudice” to the 
responsibilities of the Sudanese government). 
 167. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 420-21 
(claiming that the most probable way that the Court will get custody over an 
accused is through the cooperation of third party states). 
 168. See id.; Craig Timberg, Liberia’s Taylor Found and Arrested, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 30, 2006, at A16, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/29/AR2006032900879.html (describing Taylor’s 
apprehension in Nigeria, transfer to and arrest in Liberia, and extradition to Sierra 
Leone). See generally Pinochet III, supra note 63 (extraditing Pinochet from the 
U.K. to Spain to stand trial on charges of torture); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶ 57 (May 31, 2004) 
(upholding the validity of a SCSL warrant issued for Liberian President Taylor that 
was supposed to be executed in Ghana). 
 169. See generally Simbeye, supra note 10, at 135-36 (arguing for the need to 
balance holding international criminals accountable through Article 27 with 
granting Heads of State a degree of protection under Article 98). 
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nor the international immunities of an accused are relevant 
considerations in proceedings before the Court.170 In stark contrast, 
Article 98(1) prohibits the Court from requesting a state to arrest and 
surrender a third party national if doing so would violate the 
requested state’s “obligations under international law with respect to 
the State or diplomatic immunity of a person.”171 A straight reading 
of the two articles creates a logical knot of Gordian proportions—the 
court tasked with ending impunity for the perpetrators of the most 
serious international crimes is prevented from requesting a state to 
surrender those perpetrators if they are officials of another state.172
In the case of Al-Bashir, this inconsistency may mean that the 
Court has issued a warrant that cannot be enforced while Al-Bashir is 
in power.173 Although the loophole created by the disparity between 
Articles 27 and 98(1) should not apply to nationals of ICC Member 
States, commentators have concluded that an official’s immunities 
conferred by a non-State Party would present a bar to the Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over that person.174 The only meaningful way 
around this obstacle is for the Court to obtain a waiver of immunity 
 170. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27 (specifically mentioning the 
irrelevance of “official capacity as a Head of State” in proceedings before the 
ICC). 
 171. Id. art. 98(1). 
 172. See, e.g., Simbeye, supra note 10, at 30 (highlighting the contradiction that 
the Court could have jurisdiction over an individual but be completely barred from 
arresting that person because of the immunities he enjoys before national courts); 
Paola Gaeta, Official Capacity and Immunities, in The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, supra note 98, at 975, 992 (detailing 
the possibility that Article 98 could prevent the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over state officials in contradiction of the language of Article 27(2)). 
 173. See Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 421 (arguing 
that, with respect to the immunities of nationals of non-State Parties to the Rome 
Statute, the ICC would be prohibited by international law from acting in a way that 
would violate these immunities). 
 174. Compare Akande, International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 425 
(concluding that Article 98(1) must be read in a way that allows the Court to 
request the arrest and surrender of officials of State-Parties because, by signing the 
Rome Statute, states consented to Article 27), and Gaeta, supra note 172, at 993-
94 (finding that Article 27 would be rendered “meaningless” if the Court could not 
request the arrest and surrender of officials of State Parties), with Akande, 
International Law Immunities, supra note 11, at 421-22 (stating that under Article 
98(1), the immunities of non-State Party nationals prevent the ICC from requesting 
State Parties for their arrest), and Gaeta, supra note 172, at 994 (arguing that the 
limitations imposed by Article 98(1) should only apply to non-State Party 
officials). 
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from the official’s home state.175 Given Sudan’s hostility to the 
Prosecutor’s charges and the fact that Al-Bashir is in de facto control 
of Sudan’s government, a waiver of his Head of State immunity 
appears highly unlikely.176
2. The Limited Language of Security Council Resolution 1593 Does 
Not Impose the International Obligation on States to Cooperate with 
the ICC that is Necessary to Overcome State Deference to 
International Immunities 
As noted above, the ICC, as a tribunal created through an 
international treaty and not through a Security Council resolution, 
does not have the automatic authority to disregard immunities, 
especially when it comes to officials of non-State Parties.177 In cases 
where there will be a conflict between a State Party’s duties under 
the Rome Statute and its obligation to respect the immunities of a 
third state official, the ICC is prevented from forcing the state to 
choose which international obligation it will fulfill, and which it will 
violate.178 This limitation is not a concern with respect to the ad hoc 
tribunals179—as they are subsidiary bodies to the U.N., the ICTY and 
 175. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98(1) (allowing the Court to request 
the surrender of a third state official if the Court can obtain a waiver of immunity 
from the third state). 
 176. Cf. Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 2, ¶¶ 264-268 (describing the 
extent of Al-Bashir’s control over the Sudanese state, including its political, 
security, and military mechanisms); Flint & de Waal, This Prosecution Will 
Endanger the People, supra note 6 (illustrating Sudan’s and Al-Bashir’s rejection 
of the ICC charges). 
 177. Compare Simbeye, supra note 10, at 33 (explaining that the ICTY and 
ICTR are “supra-state” tribunals that have the independent authority to “issue 
binding orders to states and can enforce compliance”), with Annalisa Ciampi, The 
Obligation to Cooperate, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary, supra note 98, at 1607, 1631-32 (recognizing that the obligation 
of states to cooperate with the ICC does not necessarily prevail over their pre-
existing international obligations to respect immunities of third state officials). 
 178. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98(1) (prohibiting the Court from 
requiring states to “act inconsistently with [their]obligations under international 
law”); Gaeta, supra note 172, at 994 (arguing that the provisions of Article 98(1) 
prevent the Court from asking a member state to violate its international 
obligations to a third, non-State Party by arresting an official of that third state). 
 179. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of 
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 
1997, ¶ 26 (Oct. 29, 1997) (holding that when the Security Council created the 
ICTY pursuant to Chapter VII, it created erga omnes obligations on the part of all 
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ICTR are imbued with the authority of the U.N. Charter.180 This 
means that in cases of conflict between an order from one of the 
tribunals and a state’s existing international obligations, the 
tribunal’s order takes primacy.181
When compared with the Security Council resolutions that created 
the ICTY and the ICTR, and established the SCSL by agreement 
with Sierra Leone, the language of Resolution 1593 is less broad.182 
Although Resolution 1593 is explicit in authorizing the ICC to 
exercise jurisdiction over Sudanese territory and nationals, its 
language is more limited when it comes to obligating states other 
than Sudan to cooperate with the ICC.183 Indeed, Resolution 1593 
recognizes that, other than Sudan, non-State Parties to the Rome 
Statute have no obligations with respect to the ICC and only “urges” 
all states to assist the ICC.184 Because it does not bind all U.N. 
Member States in its operative paragraphs, the limited language of 
Resolution 1593 is insufficient to support a finding that there exists a
U.N. Member States to comply with the provisions of the ICTY Statute). 
 180. See Pham, supra note 150, at 80-81 (noting the differences between the 
SCSL and the ICTY/ICTR, including the SCSL’s creation through a treaty, which 
means that it does not hold primacy over state courts like the ICTY and ICTR did, 
and operates independently of the U.N. system). 
 181. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (stating that the obligations of U.N. Member 
States under the U.N. Charter trump any other international obligations); Bert 
Swart, Arrest and Surrender, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, supra note 198, at 1639, 1664 (describing how an ICTY 
order is considered to be an “enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations” and therefore requires all U.N. Member States to 
comply with that order). 
 182. Compare S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (ordering that only those states 
party to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with the Court and simply 
“urg[ing]” other states to do so), with ICTR Statute, supra note 134, ¶ 2 (ordering 
all states to “cooperate fully” with the ICTR “and that consequently all States shall 
take measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions  
of . . . the Statute”), and S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 
2000) (affirming that the international community will “exert every effort” to bring 
the perpetrators of international crimes committed in Sierra Leone to justice), and 
S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (deciding that “all states 
shall cooperate fully” with the ICTY, which includes “comply[ing] with requests 
for assistance or orders”). 
 183. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2. 
 184. Id. 
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general international obligation to cooperate with the ICC’s efforts in 
Sudan.185
In the absence of a general international obligation to cooperate 
with the ICC in cases arising out of Darfur, any state seeking to 
execute Al-Bashir’s warrant would be prevented from doing so by 
the ICJ’s Arrest Warrant Case decision. There, the ICJ held that 
incumbent foreign ministers (and, by extension, Heads of State) with 
immunity rationae personae are absolutely inviolable and immune 
from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts, even when they are 
suspected of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity.186 
Ironically, the very case that provided support to the conclusion that 
the ICC may legitimately disregard Al-Bashir’s immunities presents 
a seemingly insurmountable hurdle to his actual arrest and 
extradition by domestic authorities.187 If an ICC warrant for Al-
Bashir is to have any teeth, significant steps are necessary to ensure 
the Rome Statute’s pledge that “the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished.”188
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the serious enforcement issues raised by Al-Bashir’s 
warrant, there are three specific actions the international community 
should take to ensure that the ICC has the ability to fulfill its current 
mandate in Sudan and in future situations referred to the Court by the 
Security Council. In the short term, the Security Council should 
resist calls to defer the ICC’s proceedings in Sudan. Second, the 
Security Council should support the ICC’s efforts by issuing a 
resolution requiring all U.N. Member States to enforce the ICC’s 
decisions arising out of the situation in Darfur. Finally, in the long 
term, the international community should consider amending Article 
 185. See Heyder, supra note 7, at 654-55 (noting that the language of Resolution 
1593 creates an inconsistency whereby the Court is authorized to exercise its 
jurisdiction in Sudan, but no states other than Sudan are ordered to support the 
ICC’s mandate). 
 186. See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 64, at 24. 
 187. See Bamu, supra note 153, at 2 (stating that the precedent set by the Arrest 
Warrant Case prevents states from acting on an ICC warrant for Al-Bashir, and 
criticizing the ICC for often ignoring that it is dependant upon states, which often 
have international obligations that pre-date the Court). 
 188. Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. 
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98 of the Rome Statute to clarify that when the Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to a Security Council referral, all U.N. Member States are 
obligated to enforce the ICC’s decisions, regardless of whether they 
have signed the Rome Statute. 
A. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD AVOID DEFERRING AL-
BASHIR’S ICC PROCEEDING 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides a mechanism that permits 
the Security Council to postpone an ICC proceeding for one year.189 
Even before the Court issued Al-Bashir’s warrant, various parties 
urged the Security Council to defer the proceedings, and these calls 
have only become more insistent since the Court issued its 
decision.190 The central thrust of these arguments is that although Al-
Bashir’s past conduct is deplorable, he is an essential component of 
any peace arrangements in Sudan, and his arrest could create a 
vacuum filled with more violence.191 Regional bodies such as the 
African Union and the Arab League also oppose the warrant because 
they see Al-Bashir’s indictment as somewhat of a double standard 
that “unfairly” singles out Sudan.192
While recognizing that such concerns have validity, the Security 
Council must not defer the Court’s proceedings for two overriding 
reasons. First, postponing Al-Bashir’s charges would give implicit 
international sanction to the “climate of impunity” that fosters the 
perpetration of crimes against humanity.193 Since 1945, when the 
 189. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 16 (stipulating that the Security 
Council must adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in order to 
halt the investigations). 
 190. See, e.g., Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67 (describing 
lobbying efforts at the U.N. in favor of a deferral by a group of Arab and African 
ministers); Franklin Graham, Op-Ed., Put Peace Before Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
3, 2009, at A27 (insisting that a Security Council deferral is necessary to achieve 
peace in the region). 
 191. See, e.g., Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67 (reporting that 
those advocating for a Security Council deferral argue that it would help to achieve 
peace in Darfur); Graham, supra note 190 (maintaining that Al-Bashir was critical 
to the peace accords that brought an end to the civil war in South Sudan, and he 
has shown a willingness to “cooperate” with aid groups). 
 192. See UN Split over Darfur Peace Force, supra note 160 (describing efforts 
led by South Africa and Libya to have the Security Council defer the ICC’s 
decision on Al-Bashir’s arrest warrant). 
 193. Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67. 
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world first vowed that crimes like the Holocaust would “never be 
allowed to happen again,” it has broken that promise time after time 
in country after country.194 By some accounts, the present worldwide 
number of “those suspected of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity could run into the hundreds of thousands.”195 Of that 
group, at least several thousand suspects were in positions of 
command when the crimes were committed.196 Should the Security 
Council defer Al-Bashir’s ICC proceedings—it would legitimize his 
impunity and set a dangerous precedent for future perpetrators.197  If 
so, once again, the world’s post-Holocaust vow would prove to be 
nothing more than empty rhetoric.198
Second, allowing the desire for peace to swallow the need for 
justice and accountability ignores that in the past, peace and justice 
have not proven to be mutually exclusive concepts, and instead can 
work to reinforce each other.199 In both Serbia and Liberia, the 
international prosecutions of Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor 
undermined the authority of the criminal Heads of State, paving the 
way for eventual lasting peace in both countries.200 Moreover, on 
both occasions, there was fear that the international prosecutions
 194. Scott Lamb, Never Again?, Spiegel Online, Jan. 26, 2005, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,338612,00.html (outlining the promise 
made after World War II and recounting situations where it has been ignored 
including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur). 
 195. Donovan, supra note 156, at 3 (providing a rough estimate of the number 
of suspects by combining figures from Rwanda, Darfur, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Guatemala, among others). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Caroline Flintoft & Nick Grono, The Politics of Ending Impunity, in 
Aegis Trust, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law, supra note 156, at 
16, 18-19 (arguing that Article 16 deferrals should only be used as a “last resort” 
because of the possible damage to the Court’s authority, credibility, and deterrent 
capacity). 
 198. See Lamb, supra note 194. 
 199. See Flintoft & Grono, supra note 197, at 18 (positing that peace and justice 
efforts can proceed in tandem and pointing to Uganda and Sudan as two 
examples). 
 200. See Tracey Gurd, Arresting the “Big Fish”: Lessons on State Cooperation 
for the International Criminal Court, in Aegis Trust, The Enforcement of 
International Criminal Law, supra note 156, at 27, 28-29, 30-31 (describing the 
international prosecution and arrest of Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor and 
how these prosecutions led to internal pressure that eventually ousted both 
presidents). 
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would endanger ongoing peace efforts, and on both occasions this 
fear was proven baseless.201
B. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST ISSUE A DEFINITIVE 
RESOLUTION OBLIGATING ALL U.N. MEMBER STATES TO 
ENFORCE ICC WARRANTS THAT ARISE OUT OF THE DARFUR 
CONFLICT 
To be effective and maintain its credibility, the ICC must be 
allowed to operate as an independent body that is not swayed by 
political pressures or subsumed into a subordinate of the U.N.202 The 
Security Council, therefore, must unequivocally throw its weight 
behind the Court’s actions in Sudan.203 To do this, the Security 
Council should issue a resolution requiring the entire international 
community, not just the states that are parties to the conflict in 
Darfur, to assist the ICC as it carries out its proceedings against Al-
Bashir.204 Such a resolution would reinforce the Court’s mandate in 
Sudan and put additional domestic pressure on Al-Bashir.205
A definitive resolution of this nature would also greatly help to 
resolve the serious doubts about the practical enforcement of the 
ICC’s warrant for Al-Bashir.206 When the Security Council places a 
legal obligation on states through an explicit resolution, that duty 
takes precedence over all pre-existing international obligations.207 If 
 201. See Braced for the Aftershock, supra note 10, at 67. 
 202. See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 158, at 224 (“The Prosecutor’s duty is to 
apply the law without bowing to political considerations, and I will not adjust my 
practices to political considerations. It is time for political actors to adjust to the 
law.”); Phil Clark, If Ocampo Indicts Bashir, Nothing May Happen 1 (Oxford 
Transitional Justice Research, Working Paper No. 1, July 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Clark_Final.pdf (declaring that the ICC must 
indict Al-Bashir in order preserve its legitimacy in Darfur and fulfill its mandate in 
Sudan). 
 203. Cf. Udombana, supra note 62, at 50 (calling upon the Security Council to 
support the ICC by mobilizing a peacekeeping force in Sudan and by issuing a 
resolution sanctioning Sudan if it does not cooperate with the Court). 
 204. Cf. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 7, ¶ 2 (requiring only the cooperation of the 
GoS and other parties to the conflict in Darfur). 
 205. See Heyder, supra note 7, at 654-56 (illustrating how the Security 
Council’s failure to include a universal obligation in Resolution 1593 weakens the 
Prosecutor’s position in pressuring Sudan to turn over suspects to the Court). 
 206. See Bamu, supra note 153, at 2 (asserting that it is unlikely that “any state 
can arrest [Al-]Bashir without violating the international law on immunity”). 
 207. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the 
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there were such a universal obligation to cooperate with the ICC’s 
activities in Sudan, U.N. Member States could act to execute an ICC 
arrest warrant for Al-Bashir without concern that doing so would 
violate their obligations to respect the immunities conferred by 
Sudan.208 The Prosecutor could also use such a resolution in the 
courts of any State or non-State Party to the Rome Statute and be 
assured of its compliance with the ICC warrant.209
C. ARTICLE 98 OF THE ROME STATUTE SHOULD BE AMENDED TO 
ENSURE THAT WHEN THE ICC’S JURISDICTION IS TRIGGERED BY A 
SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL, ALL STATES ARE 
INTERNATIONALLY OBLIGATED TO ENFORCE ICC WARRANTS 
One of the envisioned functions of the ICC was to act as a 
permanent tribunal that the Security Council could activate using its 
Chapter VII authority without the need to set up another ad hoc 
tribunal such as the ICTY or ICTR.210 The benefits provided by this 
process are manifold. First, a permanent court that simply needs 
activation by the Security Council to act in a given situation 
drastically eliminates the expense and reduces the time needed to 
build a tribunal from the ground up.211 Second, the ICC has the 
ability to compile a significant body of case law that can be used in 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and 
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail.”). 
 208. See Udombana, supra note 62, at 49 (declaring that when a state carries out 
a Security Council enforcement measure, it becomes an agent of the Security 
Council and its authority to act flows directly from the U.N. Charter). 
 209. See Joyner, supra note 121, at 88-89 (stating that when the Security 
Council issues a binding resolution, the provisions of that resolution carry the force 
of law for U.N. Member States); see generally Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 
59(2) (requiring a custodial state to conduct arrest proceedings in national courts to 
determine whether the ICC warrant is applicable to the specific person, whether 
the suspect was provided with the proper process during the arrest, and whether the 
rights of the arrested person have been respected); id. art. 89(1) (requiring State 
Parties to comply with their national laws when enforcing an ICC arrest warrant); 
id. art. 93(1) (requiring State Parties to comply with their national laws when 
assisting the Court in other ways). 
 210. See Condorelli & Villalpando, supra note 105, at 628 (characterizing the 
ICC as an “ad hoc permanent” international court that provides the Security 
Council with immediate access to a judicial body). 
 211. See Marlies Glasius, The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil 
Society Achievement 12-13 (2006) (describing the “slow start[s]” of the ICTY and 
the ICTR that were the result of inadequate funding and diplomatic arguments). 
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future situations and thus eventually reduces the number of cases of 
first impression that the Court must decide.212 Finally, a permanent 
tribunal gives the Security Council the flexibility to act immediately 
in a given situation, which could potentially reduce the number or 
severity of crimes.213
The ICC, when activated by the Security Council, needs to have 
the same autonomous authority ad hoc tribunals have in order for any 
of these benefits to be realized.214 One way to provide for this 
authority is by amending Article 98 of the Rome Statute. This could 
be done by adding a provision stating that when the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over a situation has been activated by a Security Council 
referral under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, all states are 
obligated to cooperate with the ICC.215 The obligation would extend 
to all U.N. Member States, but would be limited solely to the ICC’s 
requests and orders arising out of the specific situation referred.216 
Thus, in practice, the authority of the ICC in such a situation would 
be identical to the authority enjoyed by the ad hoc tribunals: limited 
to the specific conflict in question, but extensive in the depth of state 
obligations to the Court.217
 212. Cf. William R. Pace & Jennifer Schense, The Role of Non-Governmental 
Organizations, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, supra note 98, at 105, 106 (commenting that the Rome Statute has 
resulted in the clarification and codification of many aspects of international 
criminal law). 
 213. See Condorelli & Villalpando, supra note 105, at 627 (arguing that from 
the very inception of the ICC, it was envisioned that the Security Council would 
use the Court as a tool to maintain international peace and security). 
 214. See Swart, supra note 183, at 1664 (describing the power of the ICTY to 
order states to comply with its requests). 
 215. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of 
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 
1997, ¶ 26 (Oct. 29, 1997) (holding that when the Security Council created the 
ICTY it imposed erga omnes obligations on all U.N. Member States to comply 
with the ICTY Statute); U.N. Charter art. 103 (stipulating that states’ obligations 
that arise under the U.N. Charter take precedence over all other international 
obligations). 
 216. See Udombana, supra note 62, at 49 (arguing that when the Security 
Council refers a situation to the ICC under Chapter VII, with respect to that 
specific situation, the Security Council alters the nature of the ICC from a 
horizontal, treaty-based institution, to a vertical, supra-national body). 
 217. See Joyner, supra note 121, at 88-89 (describing how the ICTY Statute 
obligates all U.N. Member States to comply with orders and requests emanating 
from the ICTY with regard to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the end, it may well be that the Prosecutor’s application serves a 
more political rather than judicial purpose.218 The practicalities of 
arresting Al-Bashir, and the repercussions that could arise from a 
power vacuum caused by his sudden imprisonment, may prove to be 
insurmountable obstacles to the execution of the ICC’s warrant.219 
These realities, however, do not excuse the international community 
of its solemn obligation to “establish conditions under which  
justice . . . can be maintained.”220 By creating the ICC and then by 
referring the violence in Darfur to that Court’s jurisdiction, the 
international community dealt the ICC a hand of cards to play. In 
turn, the Court placed its chips on the table. All that now remains to 
be seen is how the other players will react. 
 
 218. See Bamu, supra note 153, at 2 (theorizing that the ICC Prosecutor may 
have requested the arrest warrant in order to pressure Al-Bashir into peace 
negotiations in Darfur). 
 219. See id. (asserting that Al-Bashir’s immunities most likely will prevent his 
arrest and surrender to the ICC). 
 220. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
